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MODELING ALTERNATE STRATEGIES FOR
AIRLINE REVENUE MANAGEMENT

Kapil Joshi

ABSTRACT

Ever since the deregulation of the airline industry in 1978, fierce competition has
made every airline to try and gain a competitive edge in the market. In order to
accomplish this, airlines are turning to advanced optimization techniques such as revenue
management. Revenue management is a way for airlines to maximize capacity and
profitability by managing supply and demand through price management.
Over the last few years research in the field of revenue management has steadily
progressed from seat inventory control techniques such as single leg seat inventory and
network inventory control to ticket pricing techniques. Ticket pricing technique s involve
setting ticket prices according to the time remaining to depart and inventory level
conditions at that point in time. These models can be solved either by dynamic or
mathematical programming. However, these models in addition to having increased
complexity are based on several assumptions which may not be valid in real life
situations thereby limiting there applicability
In this research, we have developed computer simulation models using Arena
software as a tool to solve airline revenue management problem. Different models based
on factors such as customer behavior, which would involve the probability of a customer
accepting a ticket and relevant pricing methods such as seats remaining and time

vi

remaining have been developed with the objective to reach an optimal revenue
management policy.
Initially, the strategies have been developed and tested for a single flight leg for
different types of destinations such as tourist, business and mixed tourist and business. It
was found that models where pricing was based on seats remaining generated the most
revenue for the tourist destinations, time remaining for the business destinations and
pricing based on time and seats remaining for the mixed type. Two different strategies,
one where the ticket price for the indirect (stop-over) flight increases as more seats for
direct flight are sold and the second where the ticket price for the indirect flight decreases
have been developed for a network of three cities with direct and stop-over flights. It was
found that the first strategy works well for the business destination. There was no
significant difference between the two strategies for the other two destinations. Also the
model was run where a set percentage of seats on the direct flight are sold prior to the
opening of indirect flight bookings (blocking). It was found that blocking of seats did not
increase the total revenue generated.

vii

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The airline industry has become extremely competitive in recent years. The
number of airlines operating within the United States has increased tremendously. Since
the deregulation of the airline industry in 1978, airlines have been allowed to choose their
own market segments, decide their own routes and set their own fares as long as they
comply with the regulations laid down by the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) [Yu,
1998]. This fierce competition has made most airlines turn to advanced optimization
techniques to develop decision support systems for management and control of airline
operations.
An important aspect considered in any airline industry is the maximization of
revenue from the sale of seats in the aircraft. This is called revenue management.
Originally known as yield management, revenue management has been successfully
adapted to numerous industries in recent years including utilities, cruise lines, trucking,
amusement parks, hotels, rental cars and others.
Revenue management is a business practice that enables companies to increase
revenue by accurately matching product availability and pricing to the market demand.
Basic principle of revenue management is to maximize the revenue by controlling
inventory levels and pricing of perishable products.
Airline revenue management other than the maximization of revenue allows an
airline a chance to operate a large variety of fares so as to enhance the attractiveness of
that airline to the consumers.
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1.1 Revenue Management in the Airline Industry
Over the years airline revenue management systems have progressed from simple
leg control through segment control and finally to the origin-destination or network
control. The problem of revenue management is divided into Seat or Discount Allocation
and Ticket Pricing.

1.1.1 Seat or Discount Allocation
Also known as seat inventory control, it is the determination of optimal booking
limits for the seats in each fare class such that total revenue is maximized. Two
approaches namely single leg control and network control have been explored till now. In
single leg control the flights legs are optimized separately or one at a time where as in
network inventory control all the flight legs including connecting and direct flights
between a pair of cities are optimized simultaneously. Hence, network revenue
management is to manage the sales of ticket to local passengers as well as connecting
passengers in order to maximize revenue for the entire airline network. Typically in case
of all major airlines 25 - 50% of passengers will have at least one connection. Thus when
connecting traffic is a significant portion of total traffic, leg based revenue management
can result in allocation that are clearly sub-optimal.
Seats on an aircraft are categorized as Executive class with high fares and
Economy class with low fares. However if you consider the economy section of the
aircraft, although all seats are physically identical they are never priced identically. This
gives rise to different fare classes.
So the question is how to and how many tickets to sell within the coach class to
different customers. In the seat inventory control approach it is assumed that prices for
different fare classes are given according to some predetermined criteria and only seat
allocation needs to be determined so as to maximize the total revenue. A system called
nested reservation system [Belobaba, 1989] for determining booking limits for the fare
classes is the most common system used by airlines today.
A nested reservation system is one in which fare class inventories are structured
such that a high fare request will not be refused as long as any seats remain available in
2

lower fare classes. A nested reservation system is thus binding in its limits on lower fare
classes but its limits are transparent from above (for higher fare classes). Booking limit
for a fare class is maximum number of seats that can be sold for that fare class. For
example, if a three- fare class nested reservation system is considered then the booking
limit for the highest fare class will be the total capacity of the cabin and the next fare
class will have the booking limit equal to the total cabin capacity less the seats protected
for the higher fare class from the lower classes.
By having a nested reservation system the airline ensures that higher fare class
demands are always accepted as long as there are seats available in the cabin. In a nested
reservation system the difference between the binding limit of a higher fare class and
binding limit of the immediate lower class is called the protection level for the higher fare
class. These are the seats that are reserved or protected from sale in the lower classes.
It is desirable for the airline to sell as many tickets in the highest fare class as
possible. But just increasing number of seats that are allocated for the highest fare class
would not be beneficial because some of the seats in the highest fare class may remain
vacant when the flight takes off thus generating no revenue. On the other hand had these
seats been allocated to a lower fare class for which there may possibly be more demand
than a higher fare class, more revenue would have been generated. Hence objective of the
airline is to allocate seats for each fare class such that the mix of seats sold on the aircraft
generates max revenue.

1.1.2 Overbooking
If an airline accepts reservations only for the number of seats available then there
is always a risk of flight departing with vacant seats because of cancellations or ‘no
shows.’ However if the airline sells seats more than its capacity, then there is a possibility
that the airline may have to bump some ticket holding passengers. Such passengers are
usually rebooked on a later flight and given some compensation. However there is a loss
of good will and a bumping cost is incurred. Usually a fixed percentage is used as an
overbooking factor.
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1.1.3 Ticket Pricing
Differential pricing is the determination of prices for each class of tickets such
that the total revenue is maximized. The profit maximization price of a ticket depends on
market reactions and marginal cost, i.e., both the market and the company’s internal
structures are determinants of a ticket price. There are two key elements to a price: the
market side or the demand and supplier side or supply [Yeoman and Ingold, 1997].
Market side is the relative perceived value of a product and the consumer’s
willingness and the ability to buy the product. Sales volume represents the amount
consumed at various price levels and when combined with the value (price) indicates the
turnover generated. This relationship reflects the principles of the demand curve D1
shown in Figure 1 [Yeoman and Ingold, 1997]. Here P1 and P2 on the Y-axis represent
the two price levels, P2 being a greater price than P1 and Q1, Q2 and Q3 on the X-axis
represent the sales volume wherein Q3 is the most number of seats sold, Q2 least and Q1
in between them.
The total turnover is calculated by multiplying Q1 and P1 or Q2 and P2. The
revenue can be increased in two ways, either lower prices and raise volumes or raise
prices and accept lower volumes. These are called movements along the demand curve.
As demand is an independent variable, these movements can only result in an increase or
decrease in price. This figure basically represents the price elasticity and explains the
relationship between a change in price and change in quantity demanded.
The main thing to be considered here is that the price- volume relationship can
vary considerably between and even within markets, making the pricing decision
difficult, yet critical. In addition to such movements along the demand curve, the curve
can also shift to the right or left. When the demand curve shifts to the right (D2), it
represents an increase in demand, whereas a shift to the left (D1) represents reduced
demand. The cases of such shifts arise due to changing business environments such as
good marketing, offering promotional fares, lower rates offered by competing airlines etc.
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Figure 1 The Demand Curve
Hence, a shift in the demand curve to the right can result in a greater revenue
generation without a reduction in price (D2) or a potential to raise price and maintain
volume, perhaps raising profitability.

1.2 Characteristics of Revenue Management
The characteristics of revenue management are
1. Relatively fixed capacity. Only a fixed amount of capacity is available and cannot
be easily added or reduced, e.g. an aircraft has fixed number of seats due to cabin
restrictions and a hotel has fixed number of rooms when it is built.
2. Perishable inventory. This means there is a deadline up to which the inventory
can be sold. After that the inventory is worthless jus t like food items and cannot
be reused. The seats on an aircraft after it takes off cannot be sold and will not
generate any revenue.
3. Fluctuating demand. In most service industries demand is seasonal. Revenue
management can be used to generate more demand than usual during off-peak
periods and can help to increase revenue during peak demand period.
4. Product differentiation. This important characteristic is the main reason for a
price differential. In the coach class of an aircraft even though the seats are
physically the same, they cost different as the two individuals occupying the seats
have purchased them at a different point in time.
5

1.3 Revenue Management in Other Industries
Since American Airlines pioneered revenue management, many industries have
tried to adopt it. Not far behind the airline industry are the hotel industry and the rental
car industry. Cruise lines and tour operators are looking at revenue management too. The
movie industry and on the same lines the sporting industry would hugely bene fit from
revenue management.

1.4 Thesis Organization
The organization of the rest of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the prior
work done in the area of airline revenue management. Chapter 3 states the problem of
airline revenue management and also discusses the major assumptions that have been
made with their justifications. Chapter 4 discusses the modeling approach and the two
main factors namely pricing structure and customer behavior that affect the model.
Chapter 5 presents the results for a single flight leg model and an analysis of variance is
conducted to verify significant factors. Chapter 6 presents the strategies used in the
modeling of a network of three cities with direct and stop-over flights between them and
also present their results. Finally, Chapter 7 gives the summary and conclusions and also
states the further research that can be done in this area.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter presents an overview of the research done by various authors in the
area of revenue management. Most of the material presented in this chapter is adapted
from two excellent reviews of airline revenue management by McGill and VanRyzin
[1999] and Pak and Piersma [2002]. As stated before the problem has been more or less
divided into the seat inventory control problem and the ticket-pricing problem.

2.1 Seat Inventory Control
The seat inventory control problem involves allocation of finite seat inventory to
the demand that occurs over time before the flight is scheduled to depart. Here the
objective is to find the right mix of passengers to maximize the revenue. The problem is
approached either as single leg seat inventory control or as network inventory control.

2.1.1 Single Leg Seat Inventory Control
Here the flight legs are optimized separately. Consider a passenger traveling from
A to C through B and offering to pay $800 for his entire journey. That is, traveling from
A to C using flight legs from A to B and from B to C. It is assumed that the airline is
charging this passenger $500 for the first flight leg from A to B and $300 for the second
flight leg from B to C. Now consider a second passenger traveling from A to B and
offering to pay $600 for his journey. If the single leg approach is used, the first passenger
can be rejected on the flight leg from A to B because the second passenger is willing to
pay a higher fare on this flight leg and the airline stands to increase its revenue by $100.
But by rejecting the first passengers offer, the airline looses an opportunity to create
revenue for the combination of the two flight legs. But if the second flight leg from B to
7

C did not get filled up, then it could have been more profitable to accept the first
passenger to create revenue for both flight legs. This is the main drawback of the single
leg inventory control. Bandla [1998] proposes a solution for such an approach using
reinforcement learning. There are two categories of single leg solution methods: static
and dynamic solution methods.

2.1.1.1 Static Solution Methods
In a static model a booking period is regarded as a single interval and a booking
limit for every booking class is set at the beginning of every booking period. A drawback
of the static solution method is that it considers all the bookings done up to and at a
particular point in time and as we know the booking process is a continuous one. Hence
this is not exactly an optimal approach although it is a popular one as it can handle large
problems and also multiple leg problems.
Littlewood [1972] was the first to propose a solution method for the airline
revenue management problem for a single flight leg with two fare classes. His idea was to
equate the marginal revenue in each of the two fare classes. He suggests closing down the
low fare class when the revenue from selling another low fare seat exceeds the expected
revenue of selling the same seat at a higher fare. Belobaba [1987] extends Littlewood’s
rule to multiple fare classes and introduces the term expected marginal seat revenue
(EMSR). His method is called EMSRa and incorporates nested protection level, i.e., the
number of seats to be sold to each fare class. However his method does not yield optimal
booking limits when more than two fare classes are considered.

2.1.1.2 Dynamic Solution Methods
Dynamic solution methods for the seat inventory control problem do not
determine a booking control policy at the start of the booking period as the static solution
methods do. A dynamic model sets the booking limit for each booking class according to
the actual bookings throughout the entire booking process. However a limitation of this
approach is that the model developed is computationally intensive.
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Lee and Hersh [1993] consider a discrete time dynamic programming model. A
non-homogenous Poisson process models demand for each fare class. Use of Poisson
process gives rise to Markov Decision Process model where in booking requests at time t
are independent of the decisions made before time t, except available capacity. The entire
booking period is divided in to a number of decision periods and each request constitutes
a period. The decision rule says that a booking request is accepted only if its fare exceeds
the expected cost of seats at time t. Multiple seat bookings, which are a practical issue in
airline seat inventory control are also considered. Subramanian et al [1999] also
formulate and analyze a Markov Decision Process model for airline seat allocation on a
single leg flight with multiple fare classes. They have incorporated cancellations, no
shows and overbooking.
Lautenbacher and Stidham [1999] link the dynamic and static approaches of the
single leg seat inventory control model. They demonstrate that a common Markov
Decision process underlies both the approaches and formulate an omnibus model that
yields the static and dynamic models as special cases.

2.1.2

Network Inventory Control
Network seat inventory control is aimed at optimizing the complete network of

flight legs offered by the airline simultaneously. As explained in the example in Section
2.1.1 Single Leg Seat Inventory Control, consider that the second flight leg from B to C
do not get filled up. The first passenger flying from A to C, was obviously paying more
than the second passenger traveling from A to B for the entire journey, but was still
rejected. Hence the airline would be flying with an empty seat on flight leg B to C and
thereby losing potential revenue on flight leg B to C. In this process the airline increased
its revenue by $100. However if the first passenger was accepted, then there would be no
vacant seats on any of the flight legs and the airline would have increased its revenue by
$200 instead. Thus accepting the first passenger would maximize total revenue of both
the flight legs. This is network revenue management. Network inventory control takes in
to account the overall revenue the passenger creates from its origin to its destination.
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Singh [2002] proposes a stochastic approximation approach to such an airline network
revenue management problem and solves it using reinforcement learning algorithm.

2.2 Ticket Pricing Models
It is now common for airline practitioners to view pricing as part of the revenue
management process. The reason for this is pretty clear - the existence of differential
pricing for airline seats is the starting point of airline revenue management and price is
generally the most important determinant of passenger demand behavior. There is also a
natural duality between price and seat allocation decisions. If price is viewed as a
variable that can be controlled on a continuous basis, raising the price sufficiently high
can shut down a booking class. Also when there are many booking classes available,
shutting down a booking class can be viewed as changing the price structure faced by the
customer.

2.2.1 Dynamic Pricing Models
Treatments of revenue management as a dynamic pricing model can be found in
the work done by Carvalho and Puterman [2003]. They considered a problem of setting
prices dynamically to maximize expected revenues in a finite horizon model in which the
demand distribution parameters are unknown. The authors suggests a promising pricing
policy called the “one step look ahead rule” where in a Taylor series expansion of the
future reward function illustrates the tradeoff between short term revenue management
and future information gains.
Chatwin [1999] proposes an optimal dynamic pricing model of perishable
products with stochastic demand. A finite set of allowable prices is assumed. A
continuous time dynamic programming model is employed in which at any given time
the state of the model is the number of items in the inventory and the retailer’s decision is
to choose the price to sell at. Demand is assumed to be Poisson with decreasing rate. This
model verifies the intuition that optimal price is non- increasing in the remaining
inventory and non-decreasing in the time to go. Gallego and Van Ryzin [1994] suggest a
dynamic pricing policy of inventories with stochastic demand. Their formulation uses
10

intensity control and obtains structural monotonic results for the optimal price as a
function of the stock level and the amount of time left. However they allow only a finite
number of prices.
Feng and Gallego [1995] investigate the problem of deciding the optimal timing
of a single price change from a given initial price to either a given lower or higher second
price. They show that the optimal policy is to decrease the initial price as soon as the time
to go falls below a time threshold which depends on the number of yet unsold items.
While the model is realistic for retailers of seasonal goods and for certain nonstop flights,
it does not extend to multiflight, multileg situation where customers from different
itineries compete for the capacity of the flight legs. Feng and Xiao [2000a] generalize the
results from the above policy by incorporating risk analysis and multiple price changes.
Also Feng and Gallego [2000] also extend their original work to address the problem of
deciding the optimal timing of price change within a given menu of allowable, possibly
time dependent price paths each of which is associated with a general Poisson process
with Markovian, time dependent predictable intensities.
Feng and Xiao [2000b] present a continuous time yield management model with
multiple prices and reversible changes in price. Demand at each price is Poisson with
constant intensities. The problem is formulated as an intensity control model and optimal
solution in closed form is derived. The model further improves the one proposed in Feng
and Gallego [1995], as an exact solution rather than a deterministic one is obtained.
Gallego and VanRyzin [1997] also propose a multi product dynamic pricing problem
with its application to network yield management. They start with a demand for each
product, which is a stochastic point process with an intensity that is a vector of the prices
of the products and the time at which they are offered. An upper bound for the optimal
expected revenue is established by analyzing the deterministic version of the problem.
From the revie w of the literature done in this chapter it can be summarized that
most of the research that has been done is in the area of seat inventory control which
again could be categorized in to single leg and network seat inventory control. Whatever
little has been done in the field of ticket pricing has been using mathematical or dynamic
programming models that are computationally intensive and time consuming. Also most
11

of these models are fairly complicated and they make simplifying assumptions such as
pre-determined prices, no batch/multiple seat bookings, stochastic demand, fixed number
of seats assigned to each fare class, lower fare class requests arrive before higher fare
class requests etc. Hence the validity of these models is under question and their exact
solutions may not be worked out. In the next chapter we state our research objectives
along with the parameters and the assumptions made.

12

CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH STATEMENT

In this chapter the problem of network revenue management is stated. The main
objectives of this research are also discussed. The major assumptions that have been
made are explained with their justifications.

3.1 Problem Statement
The problem considered in this research constitutes a network of three cities with
multiple origin-destination combinations. There are direct and stop-over flights in
between them. The revenue generated from the sale of tickets on all flights in their coach
class in the network is to be maximized. Passengers request reservations in the coach
class of the flight depending upon their preferred itineraries. Every time a passenger
requests a reservation, the airline checks for the availability of seats for that itinerary. If
seats are available, the airline provides the passenger with a fare and the passenger
decides whether to accept or reject the fare.
Customer arrivals are assumed to follow a non-stationary Poisson process (an
arrival process, which has a rate that varies over time). The objective here is to maximize
the revenue generated from sale of seats over the entire network. Also policies to be
followed for the sale of tickets on the direct and the stop-over flight for the same final
destination have to be developed.

13

3.2 Research Assumptions
The following parameters have been considered in this research
•

Network Details

A network of three cities has been considered in this research. Only one-way travel
between the cities is considered for modeling purposes and no round trip fare option
is offered. However the return part of the journey could be modeled as a percentage
of the cost of the first part of the journey and it would be also dependent on the date
of the return trip. A request for a booking is always associated with a particular
origin-destination. For example consider a network of three cities namely Tampa,
Atlanta and New York. A flight from Tampa to New York via Atlanta (stop-over
flight) would be a different origin destination combination from a flight flying
directly between Tampa and New York (direct flight).
•

Fair Structure

The range of fares for different origin destination combinations is different and is predetermined. Considering the above example the range of fares for a flight from
Tampa to New York via Atlanta would be different from the fares for a direct flight
between the two cities. Hence the fare structure would vary depending on whether it
is a direct flight or with a layover and also factors such as the distance between the
cities etc.
•

Arrival Process

Many systems are subject to experience arrival loads that can vary dramatically over
the time frame of the simulation. There is a specific probabilistic model for this called
the non-stationary Poisson process, which provides an accurate way to reflect timevarying arrival patterns. Hence the passengers in our model are assumed to arrive
with a nonstationary Poisson process and each origin destination combination has its
own arrival process.

3.3 Factors and Strategies Considered
Three main factors and three individual strategies will be considered in this
model. The factors are pricing strategy, acceptance probability and customer arrival rate.
14

3.3.1 Pricing Strategy
The pricing strategy basically means the different ways the customer is charged a
price. This could be categorized on the basis of the time left to depart (time remaining
strategy), or up on the number of seats left to be sold, i.e. seats remaining strategy or
could be a combination of both called the hybrid strategy.

3.3.2 Acceptance Probability
Acceptance Probability reflects up on the probability that a customer will
purchase a ticket. It could be classified according to the price being offered to the
customer or probability w.r.t. price strategy or according to time left to depart called
probability w.r.t. time strategy or could be a combination of both called composite
probability.

3.3.3 Customer Arrival Rate
Three different customer arrival rates of low, medium and high each suggesting a
market with a low demand, medium and high demand for tickets has been experimented
with.

3.4 Research Objectives
Our objective is to develop an optimal ticket pricing policy for the airline
industry. Different pricing strategies such as seats remaining, time remaining, and hybrid
strategy as well as acceptance strategies such as probability of a customer buying a seat
with respect to time, price or a combination of both are developed and tested using
simulation models. Initially the pricing policy is developed for a single flight leg and then
for a network of cities to explore the alternatives for direct and indirect flights that
airlines can offer to maximize their revenue. The comparison of results from these
strategies can help in determining the optimal ticket pricing policy for the airline
industry.
The factors considered and the strategies used is presented in the next chapter and
explained in detail with the aid of an example.
15

CHAPTER 4
MODELING AND SOLUTION METHODOLOGY

This chapter discusses in detail the main factors that are used in the development
of a single leg model. The three main factors are the pricing strategy, acceptance
probability and customer arrival rate.

4.1 Pricing Strategy
The pricing strategy that we have used in this research is based on the prices
being offered online by some popular airlines. Generally it was observed that the price of
a fare for a 30-day period varied from 2 times to a maximum of 3 times the cheapest fare.
However what is more interesting is as to how these prices are offered to the customers
and at what point of time in to the booking period. The pricing strategy can be explained
using three different approaches.

4.1.1 Time Remaining Approach
At the start of the booking period, when the entire capacity of the aircraft is
available and in order to attract more customers to sell as many seats as possible, airlines
offer the cheapest fares. The fares go on increasing as the time to depart nears and the
number of seats available becomes less. In such a scenario last minute customers will end
up paying the most expensive fares the airline has to offer. The relationship between time
remaining and price offered is a linear one and is shown in Figure 2. The equation that
describes this relationship is as follows.
Price Offered = Pmax – (Time Remaining) * j
where,
Price Offered is the price at which the ticket is sold to the customer.
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(1)

Pmax is the maximum ticket price set by the airline.
Pmin is the minimum ticket price set by the airline.
Time Remaining is the time left for the flight to depart.
j is a normalizing constant such that Price Offered will be Pmin , when Time Remaining is
30 days.
This equation satisfies our initial condition that price offered is least at the start of the
booking period and is the highest when the flight is about to depart.

4.1.2 Seats Remaining Approach
When the entire seat inventory is available at hand and in order to kick-start the
booking process, the cheapest fare is offered. The price goes on increasing as the number
of seats reduces and the last seat is offered at the highest price. The relationship which is
linear is shown in Figure 3. The equation used is as follows
Price Offered = Pmax – (Seats Remaining) * k

(2)

where in,
Seats remaining are the number of seats still available for sale at that time.
k is a normalizing constant such that Price Offered will be Pmax , when Seats Remaining
will be zero.

Price

Price

Time Remaining

Seats Remaining

Figure 2. Graph of Price Offered and
Remaining Time

Figure 3. Graph of Price Offered and
Remaining Seats
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This equation also satisfies the conditions that price offered is lowest when most of the
seats are remaining and vice versa.

4.1.3 Hybrid Approach
Both the approaches are logical in their own ways. However consider the case
when after a few days in to the booking period, very few or almost no seats are sold. The
first approach would entail the airline to charge a higher price as the time to depart nears
where as the second approach would require the airline to charge a lower price since very
few seats were sold. Hence the need for a hybrid model was felt. The hybrid approach
would charge fares depending on the number of seats sold as well as the number of days
into the booking period. Here we use the equation
Price Offered = Pmax - (Time Remaining) * j – (Seats Remaining) * k

(3)

where,
j and k are normalizing constants such that Price Offered is Pmax,, when Time Remaining
is equal to the booking period and Seats Remaining is close to zero.

4.2 Acceptance Probability
The probability of a customer accepting or rejecting a seat is called acceptance
probability and this probability can be classified into three different types depending up
on the price and the time at which the customer accepts it and their combination.

4.2.1 Probability with Respect to Price Offered
If a lower price is offered by the airline, the tickets are likely to be sold easily.
Hence a very high acceptance probability is assumed when the cheapest fare is offered.
However, as the fare increases, the probability of acceptance decreases leading to the
lowest probability when the fare offered is the highest. The equation used is
Probability of Acceptance = 100 – (Price Offered –Cheapest Price)*l
where,
l is the normalizing constant such that Probability of Acceptance is 100% when Price
Offered is the Cheapest Price.
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(4)

This equation will return a 100% probability of acceptance when price offered is the
lowest and vice versa. Figures 4 and 5 show the graphs of the probability of acceptance
with respect to the price offered and time remaining respectively.

Prob. of

Prob. of

Acceptance

Acceptance

Price

Time Remaining

Figure 4 Graph of Probability of

Figure 5 Graph of Probability of

Acceptance and Price Offered

Acceptance and Time Remaining

4.2.2 Probability with Respect to Time Remaining
When the bookings open say 30 days before departure, there is very little rush to
buy and hence the probability of acceptance is also very low. However as the date of
departure approaches, more customers especially business travelers tend to buy tickets at
whatever price. Hence the probability of acceptance is greater towards the end. The
equation we have used here is,
Probability of Acceptance = 100 – (Time Remaining)*m

(5)

This equation follows the initial as well as the final conditions of 100% and 50%
probability of acceptance. The graph of time remaining and probability is linear and is
shown in Fig. 5.

4.2.3 Composite Probability
Both the probability approaches mentioned above are correct in their individual
capacity. However consider the case when the bookings are just opened and at the same
time the lowest fares are offered by the airline. The probability with respect to price
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would suggest a higher probability of acceptance as the ticket price is the lowest; where
as the probability with respect to time would suggest a lower probability of acceptance as
it is too early in the booking period and the customer is in no particular hurry to book.
Hence the need for a composite probability approach that models the customer behavior
on the basis of price offered and time remaining. Here we have used the equation
Probability of Acceptance = 100 – (Price Offered –Cheapest Price)*l – (Time
Remaining)*m

(6)

This equation satisfies the initial conditions of higher probability when price offered is
the cheapest and Time Remaining is 30 days and vice versa.
l and m are the respective normalizing constants.

4.3 Customer Arrival Rate
The booking process is assumed to start 30 days in advance and this 30 day period
is divided in to 6 time slots of 5 days each. Three different customer arrival rates of low,
medium and high have been used and the customers arrive according to non-stationary
Poisson process.

4.4 Simulation as a Tool
There have been several models based on mathematical programming techniques
to tackle the airline revenue management problem. However, these models are based on
many simplifying assumptions such as pre-determined prices, no batch/multiple seat
bookings, fixed number of seats assigned to each fare class, lower fare class requests
arrive before higher fare class requests, etc. which are not realistic. In spite of these
assumptions the models are quite complex to build, understand and solve. The strategies
and policies developed earlier in this chapter are tested using computer simulation models
in this research. The reason for using simulation is that it allows the models to represent
the real world system faithfully. However, the results are based on statistical foundations.
Therefore, while using simulation models one needs to verify and validate them. Also,
the statistical issues should be resolved properly in order for the results to be valid and
meaningful.
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4.5 Model Development
Using equations (1) through (6), we consider the development of a single leg
airline revenue management model. Based on the outcome of this model, we develop a
network revenue management model of three cities. Booking period in all the models
starts 30 days in advance. Customers arrive according to Poisson process, which has a
rate that varies with respect to time (non-stationary Poisson process). The number of seats
on the aircraft is fixed.
A range of fares with an upper limit equal to the maximum price offered and
lower limit equal to the minimum price offered is set by the airline. Each arriving
customer is offered a ticket price by the airline booking system according to the pricing
structure i.e., according to the time remaining, seats remaining and hybrid approach. It is
up to the customer to decide whether to accept or reject the offered ticket price. This is
called acceptance probability. Also this decision is a two way by chance probability. If
the customer rejects the offer, he exits the booking system.
If the customer accepts the offer price, a seat is reserved for him/her and the total
number of seats available for sale is reduced by one. The ticket price offered and the total
revenue generated at this stage is recorded. Our objective in this model is to maximize
revenue within the above- mentioned boundaries and conditions.
Here we are considering nine different models depending on the pricing structure
(seats remaining, time remaining and hybrid approach) and customer behavior
(probability with regards to price and time as well as hybrid probability) and their
combinations. Also depending on the probability of accepting a ticket, an approximation
of the type of destination served by the flight such as a tourist destination, business
destination or a mix of both can be obtained. Hence the model combinations could be as
shown in Table1.
In this chapter we have presented the strategies for ticket pricing and probability
of accepting the price offered for different types of customers. The corresponding
equations were formulated as well. The numerical analyses of these strategies and their
results are presented in the next chapter.
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Table 1 Model Combinations
Model Type

Pricing Strategy based on

Seats Rem. & Price Prob.

Seats Remaining

Time Rem & Price Prob.

Time Remaining

Hybrid Price & Price Prob.

Time and Seats Remaining

Seats Rem & Time Prob

Seats Remaining

Time Rem & Time Prob

Time Remaining

Hybrid Price & Time Prob.

Time and Seats Remaining

Seats Rem. &Hybrid Prob.

Seats Remaining

Time Rem & Hybrid Prob.

Time Remaining

Hybrid Price & Hybrid Prob Time and Seats Remaining
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Type of Destination
Mainly Tourist Destination
(e.g. Las Vegas)

Mainly Business
Destination (e.g. Detroit)

Could be a mix of both (e.g.
New York)

CHAPTER 5
EXPERIMENT DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS

In this chapter the policies and strategies as discussed in the previous section are
tested using simulation models and their results are presented. Also an analysis of
variance is performed.

5.1 Single Leg Models
In this section we have consid ered nine different models with their assumptions
and necessary details and have compared their results. For this flight leg, a flight capacity
of 200 passengers is assumed. The minimum price offered by the airline is $125 per
ticket whereas the maximum is $400. The booking of this flight leg starts 30 days in
advance. A fare offered is for the first part of the round trip and only the forward part of
the journey is modeled. The return part can be modeled in a similar fashion. The time
duration of 30 days is divided in to 6 time slots of 5 days each. The customer arrivals are
assumed to follow Poisson distribution with arrival rates that vary with respect to time.
Three different arrival rates have been used. The terminating condition for this model
could be either when all the seats are sold out or when the end of the booking period is
reached.

5.1.1 Normalizing Constants
In this section we describe how we have calculated the values of the normalizing
constants j, k, l and m.

5.1.1.1 Time Remaining Approach
Price Offered = Pmax – (Time Remaining) * j
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Initially when we open the bookings, the time remaining is 30 days and price offered is
the cheapest price. Hence,
125 = 400 – (30)*j
which gives us a value of j = 9.167

5.1.1.2 Seats Remaining Approach
Price Offered = Pmax – (Seats Remaining) * k
Initially when the booking is opened the entire seat inventory is available and hence, the
cheapest fare is offered. Therefore,
125 = 400 – (200)*k
which gives us k = 1.375

5.1.1.3 Hybrid Approach
Price Offered = Pmax - (Time Remaining) * j – (Seats Remaining) * k
The total price differential between the minimum and the maximum price offered is
(400-125) = 275, the time remaining is 30 days and seats are 200.
Case 1. Balanced Weights. If we decide to assign equal weight to both the time remaining
and seats remaining then we have
275*0.5 = 30j which gives a value of j = 4.58. Also
275*0.5 = 200k which gives a value of k = 0.6875.
Case 2. Weighted towards Seats Remaining. Suppose we decide to assign 20% weight to
the time remaining and the remaining 80% weight to the seats remaining, we have
275*0.2 = 30j which gives j = 1.8333 and
275*0.8 = 200k which gives k = 1.1
Case 3. Weighted towards Time Remaining. Instead, if 80 % weight is attached to the
time remaining and 20 % to seats remaining, then
275*0.8 = 30j

or, j = 7.3333

275*0.2 = 200k

or, k = 0.275
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5.1.1.4 Probability of Acceptance with Respect to Price Offered
Probability of Acceptance = 100 – (Price Offered –Cheapest Price)*l
The probability of acceptance is set to range between a high level of 100% and a low
level of 50%. When price offered is the highest probability of acceptance is the lowest.
This gives us,
50 = 100 – (400-125)*l

or, l = 0.1818.

5.1.1.5 Probability of Acceptance with Respe ct to Time Remaining
Probability of Acceptance = 100 – (Time Remaining)*m
If the time remaining is 30 days then the probability of accepting a ticket is on the lower
side considering all the time the customer has to choose a flight. Therefore we have,
50 = 100 – (30)*m

or, m = 1.6667

5.1.1.6 Composite Probability
Probability of Acceptance = 100 – (Price Offered – Cheapest Price)*l – (Time
Remaining)*m
The probability of acceptance is set at two levels 100 % and 50 % and their differential is
50. The price offered differential is 275 and time remaining is 30 days. Thus,
Case1. Balanced Weights. The probability of acceptance depending up on the price
offered and time remaining is given equal weight. This is an example of a mixed type of
market where the demand by tourists as well as business travelers is equal (e.g. New
York).
50*0.5 = 275l

or, l = 0.0909

50*0.5 = 30m

or, m = 0.83

Case2. Weighted Towards Price Offered. Here the price offered is given 80 % weight and
time remaining is given 20 % weight. This is an example of a tourist driven market where
majority of the passengers are price conscious tourists (e.g. Las Vegas).
50*0.8 = 275l which gives l = 0.1454
50*0.2 = 30m

or, m = 0.3333
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Table 2 Table of Normalizing Constants and Their Value s

Equation
Price Offered = Pmax – (Time Remaining) * j

Criterion
Time
Remaining

Normalizing Constant

Price Offered = Pmax – (Seats Remaining) * k

Seats
Remaining

k= 1.375

Price Offered = Pmax - (Time Remaining) * j –
(Seats Remaining) * k

Time and
Seats
Remaining

j = 4.58 & k = 0.6875 (Equal Weights)
j = 1.8333 & k = 1.1 (Weighted Towards Seats)
j = 7.3333 & k = 0.275 (Weighted Towards Time)

Probability of Acceptance = 100 – (Price
Offered –Cheapest Price)*l

Price Offered l = 0.1818

Probability of Acceptance = 100 – (Time
Remaining)*m
Probability of Acceptance = 100 – (Price
Offered - Cheapest Price)*l – (Time
Remaining)*m

Time
Remaining
Price Offered
and Time
Remaining

j = 9.167

m = 1.6667
l = 0.0909 & m = 0.83 (Equal Weights)
l = 0.1454 & m = 0.3333 (Weighted Towards Price)
l = 0.0363 & m = 1.3333 (Weighted Towards Time)
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Case3. Weighted Towards Time Remaining. The time to depart is given more weight
(80%) and price offered is given 20 % weight. This example could represent a market
where majority of customers are business travelers (e.g. Detroit).
50*0.2 = 275l

or, l = 0.0363

50*0.8 = 30m

or, m = 1.3333

The different policies we discussed so far and their corresponding normalizing constants
have been stated in Table 2.

5.1.2 Arrival Rate
The customer arrivals follow a non-stationary Poisson arrival process with three
different arrival rates of low, medium and high. The booking period of 30 days is divided
in to 6 time slots of 5 days each and each time slot having a different arrival rate. A low
arrival rate can be 0.16, 0.25, 0.33, 0.41, 0.25, 0.33 per hour which corresponds to 4, 6, 8,
10, 6, 8 customers per day. A medium arrival rate can be 0.20, 0.30, 0.35, 0.45, 0.38, 0.33
which corresponds to 5, 7, 8, 11, 9, 8 customers per day. A high arrival rate is 0.35, 0.40,
0.45, 0.48, 0.30, and 0.35 which is 8, 9, 10, 11, 7 and 8 arrivals per day. The arrival rates
can be summarized from the following table.
Table 3 Arrival Rates
Arrival Rate(Number of customers per day for every 5 days)

Low

0-5
days
4

5-10
days
6

10-15
days
8

15-20
days
10

20-25
days
6

25-30
days
8

Total
Customers
210

Medium

5

7

8

11

9

8

240

High

8

9

10

11

7

8

265

Type

The arrival rates are also calculated in terms of number of customers per hour as
Arena software is unable to accept the arrival rate in terms of customers per day. If the
number of customers per day is 6, then 6/24 = 0.25 would be the arrival rate per hour.
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Table 4 Comparison of Single Leg Models for Low Arrival Rate

Customer
Arrivals

Tickets
Purchased

Model Type
Seats Rem &
207
162
Price Prob
Time Rem &
207
151
Price Prob
Hybrid Price
207
157
& Price Prob
Seats Rem &
207
160
Time Prob
Time Rem &
207
160
Time Prob
Hybrid Price
207
160
& Time Prob
Seats Rem &
207
162
Hybrid Prob
Time Rem &
207
153
Hybrid Prob
Hybrid Price
207
159
& Hybrid
*days into the booking period

Customers Customers
balked
lost due to
(high price)
no seats

Seats
Vacant

Average
Revenue
($)

Half
Width**
($)

Avg.
Time
Ticket Seats get
Price($)
Full*

44

0

37

38,274

570

235

n/a

56

0

49

39,431

585

261

n/a

49

0

43

38,915

575

247

n/a

46

0

40

37,685

754

234

n/a

46

0

40

46,086

668

287

n/a

46

0

40

39,343

732

245

n/a

45

0

38

38,203

723

235

n/a

54

0

47

40,802

598

267

n/a

47

0

41

43,511

636

273

n/a

**based on 95% Confidence Interval
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Type of
Destination
Mainly
tourist
destination
e.g. Las
Vegas
Mainly
business
destination
e.g. Detroit
Could be a
mix of both
e.g. New
York

Table 5 Comparison of Single Leg Models for Medium Arrival Rate

Customer
Tickets
Model Type
Arrivals Purchased
Seats Rem &
241
182
Price Prob
Time Rem &
241
177
Price Prob
Hybrid Price
241
180
& Price Prob
Seats Rem &
243
188
Time Prob
Time Rem &
241
186
Time Prob
Hybrid Price
241
186
& Time Prob
Seats Rem &
243
189
Hybrid Prob
Time Rem &
241
182
Hybrid Prob
Hybrid Price
241
185
& Hybrid
*days into the booking period

Customers
balked (high
price)

Customers
lost due to
no seats

Seats
Vacant

Average
Revenue
($)

Half
Width**
($)

59

0

18

45,396

633

249

n/a

64

0

23

46,116

624

261

n/a

61

0

20

45,778

616

254

n/a

54

0

12

47,731

808

253

n/a

54

0

14

53,328

677

286

n/a

54

0

14

48,301

786

259

n/a

54

0

11

47,954

752

254

n/a

59

0

18

49,852

649

274

n/a

55

0

15

51,104

669

275

n/a

**based on 95% Confidence Interval
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Avg.
Time
Ticket Seats get
Price($)
Full*

Type of
Destination
Mainly
tourist
destination
e.g. Las
Vegas
Mainly
business
destination
e.g. Detroit
Could be a
mix of both
e.g. New
York

Table 6 Comparison of Single Leg Models for High Arrival Rate

Customers Customers
Tickets
balked
lost due to
Purchased (high price)
no seats
73

Customer
Model Type
Arrivals
Seats Rem &
279
197
Price Prob
Time Rem &
280
199
Price Prob
Hybrid Price
280
198
& Price Prob
Seats Rem &
279
198
Time Prob
Time Rem &
279
198
Time Prob
Hybrid Price
279
198
& Time Prob
Seats Rem &
280
198
Hybrid Prob
Time Rem &
280
198
Hybrid Prob
Hybrid Price
280
198
& Hybrid
*days into the booking period

Seats
Vacant

Average
Revenue
($)

Half
Width**
($)

9

0

51,285

370

259

17

56

24

0

47,255

310

237

23

66

16

0

49,603

275

250

20

69

12

0

51,569

354

260

22

69

12

0

52,986

303

267

21

69

12

0

51,853

317

261

21

70

0

2

51,532

341

260

n/a

64

0

2

49,998

313

252

n/a

68

0

2

51,808

289

261

n/a

**based on 95% Confidence Interval
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Avg.
Time
Ticket Seats get
Price($)
Full*

Type of
Destination
Mainly
tourist
destination
e.g. Las
Vegas
Mainly
business
destination
e.g. Detroit
Could be a
mix of both
e.g. New
York

5.2 Results and Analysis
Using the above values of j, k, l and m, the nine models are run for a replication
length of 30 days and 100 replications each for low, medium and high arrival rates. The
number of replications have been calculated to obtain a half width of less than 2% of the
revenue generated and has been explained in Appendix B. The results are shown in
Tables 4, 5 and 6 respectively and are average for 100 replications. The first column
indicates the model type as explained in detail in Table 1 and the last column gives the
exact time in to the booking period when the seats get full.
Tourists are mostly price conscious people and hence tend to book their flights
well in advance. Hence their acceptance probability of a ticket would be mostly based on
price. From Table 4 we observe that for the tourist destination any of the three models
could be used as the average revenue generated is pretty much the same. The half widths
of all the three revenue generated values overlap and hence, there is no significant
difference between the three values. Since average ticket price is the least for Seats Rem
& Price Prob model, this could be the optimal strategy. Also out of the three models the
Seats Rem & Price Prob model sells the most seats.
Business travelers generally tend to book late in the booking period and price is
not really the deciding factor for them. Hence their acceptance probability of a ticket
would be mostly based on time. From Table 4 we observe that for the business
destination, the revenue generated by all the three models is significantly different as
their half widths do not overlap. Time Rem and Time Prob generates the most revenue as
price is charged according to time remaining and business customers tend to book late
when the price is higher. Also average ticket price is the most for this model. Hybrid
Price & Time Prob model generates the second most revenue and Seats Rem & Time
Prob the least revenue. Numbers of seats remaining vacant are the same in all the models.
For a mixed type of destination which would have both tourist and business
travelers, the probability of acceptance would be based on both time and price offered.
The revenue generated by Seats Rem & Hybrid Prob and Time Rem & Hybrid Prob is not
significantly different as their half widths overlap. But the revenue generated by Hybrid
Price and Hybrid Prob is significantly different from the other two models. This model
generates the most revenue as price offered is according to both time and seats remaining
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and both types of customers, tourists and business book on this flight. Also the average
ticket price is not very high and hence, this could be the optimal policy. Time Rem &
Hybrid Prob generates the second most revenue. Average ticket price is the slightly less
for Time Rem & Hybrid Prob, but since less customers book this flight average revenue
generated is less. The most number of customers purchasing tickets is in the Seats Rem &
Hybrid Prob model, but as the average ticket price is least the revenue generated is also
the least.
Similar conclusions can be drawn from Table 5 and 6 with the only exception that
for the high arrival rate, the Seats Rem. and Price Prob. generates the most revenue for
the tourist destination. This could be attributed to the high rate of arrival which fills up
the seats faster when the ticket price is low. All these results have been summarized
according to the arrival rate and destination type in Table 7.
Table 7 Best Pricing Strategy

Arrival Rate
Low
Medium
High

Tourist
Seats Rem & Price
Prob
Seats Rem & Price
Prob
Seats Rem. & Price
Prob

Destination Type
Business
Time Rem & Time
Prob
Time Rem & Time
Prob
Time Rem & Time
Prob

Mixed
Hybrid Price &
Hybrid Prob
Hybrid Price &
Hybrid Prob
Hybrid Price &
Hybrid Prob

5.2.1 Sensitivity Analysis
To test the sensitivity of the results obtained from our model we have taken a
second example and verified if the results and conclusions drawn are consistent with the
original example. In this second example we have assumed a flight capacity of 300
passengers with the lower price limit being set at $200 and the higher limit at $425. The
booking period was kept at 30 days and two arrival rates (low and medium) were
adjusted corresponding to the increase in flight capacity. The adjusted low arrival rate
gives 0.35, 0.45, 0.53, 0.50, 0.38 and 0.43 customers per hour or 8, 11, 13, 12, 9 and 10
customers per day. The adjusted medium arrival rate gives 0.38, 0.45, 0.50, 0.63, 0.55
and 0.50 customers per hour or 9, 11, 12, 15, 13 and 12 customers per day. All the nine
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models were run for 100 replications for the adjusted low and medium rate of arrivals.
The revenues generated by the hybrid probability models were used for verifying the
sensitivity of the results. The revenue generated by the original example and this second
example are shown in Table 8 and 9.

Table 8 Revenues for Low and Adjusted Low Rate of Arrival
Model Type

Revenue Generated by
Original Example ($)

Revenue Generated by
Second Example ($)

Seats Remaining & Hybrid
38,203 (13.8%)*
60,866(8.8%)*
Probability
Time Remaining & Hybrid
40,802 (6.6)*
62,326(6.3%)*
Probability
Hybrid Price & Hybrid
43,511
66,267
Probability
*proportion by which this revenue is less than the maximum revenue

Table 9 Revenues for Medium and Adjusted Medium Rate of Arrival
Model Type

Revenue Generated by
Original Example ($)

Revenue Generated by
Second Example ($)

Seats Remaining & Hybrid
47,954(6.5%)*
72,228(7.2%)*
Probability
Time Remaining & Hybrid
49,852(2.5%)*
74,940(3.3%)*
Probability
Hybrid Price & Hybrid
51,104
77,465
Probability
*proportion by which this revenue is less than the maximum revenue

From Table 8 it can be observed that the hybrid price policy generates the most
revenue followed by the time remaining model. The seats remaining model generates the
least revenue for both the examples. The percentage loss in the revenue compared with
the best policy is given in parentheses for both the examples. It can be seen that the
relative performance of all the policies in the second example is consistent with that of
original problem. Similar observations can be drawn from Table 9. The outcome of the
second example reinforces our belief that the strategies that have been modeled are robust
with regard to assumptions that have been made regarding ticket pricing, plane capacity
and arrival population.
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5.2.1 Analysis of Variance
In order to compare the results produced by different simulations runs and to find
out the impact the parameters that are varied (controls) have on the results (response) we
perform analysis of variance also called ANOVA. The hybrid price and hybrid
probability model is considered as a sample example. We believe that there are two
factors that if varied will give significant changes in the revenue generated. These two
factors are the price offered and probability of acceptance. The price offered and
probability of acceptance are determined by the following equations,

Price Offered = Pmax - (Time Remaining) * j – (Seats Remaining) * k
Probability of Acceptance = 100 – (Price Offered-Cheapest Price)*l – (Time
Remaining)*m
where j, k, l and m are normalizing constants as shown in Table 2. Another factor we
believe most certainly has an impact on the revenue generated is the arrival rate and
hence we intend to conduct an analysis of the significant factors at all three levels of the
arrival rate. However for the sake of our proposal we have used the low rate of arrival.

Table 10 Controls and Their Levels
Control

Level 1

Level 2

Level 3

Pricing Strategy

Weighted towards
Seats Remaining

Balanced Weights

Weighted towards
Time Remaining

Acceptance
Probability

Weighted Towards
Price Offered

Balanced Weights

Weighted Towards
Time Remaining

Arrival Rate

Low

Medium

High

The ANOVA for this 2 factorial, 3 level design is performed using Minitab software for
10 replicates at each level for the low arrival rate. The analysis of variance is as follows.
Multilevel Factorial Design
Factors:
Base runs:
Base blocks:

2
9
1

Replicates:
Total runs:
Total blocks:

10
90
1
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Number of levels: 3, 3

Analysis of Variance for Revenue Generated, using Adjusted
SS for Tests
Source
DF
Pricing Strategy
2
Acceptance Prob.
2
Pricing Strategy*AcceptProb 4

Seq SS
133526695
1071964396
25370324

Adj SS
133526695
1071964396
25370324

Adj MS
66763348
535982198
6342581

Error
Total

808115814
2038977229

808115814

9976738

81
89

F
6.69
53.72
0.64

P
0.002
0.000
0.638

From the above analysis we see that the F value s for Pricing Strategy (6.69) and the Fvalue for Acceptance Probability (53.72) are greater than F0.05, 2, 81 (3.15). Hence we can
conclude that both Pricing Strategy and Acceptance Probability are significant factors
and their interaction Pricing Strategy*Acceptance Probability is not significant as its F
value (0.64) is less than 3.15. The ANOVA for the medium and high arrival rates also
indicate similar results. They have been attached in the Appendix portion of this
document. From Table 3 we can observe that the time remaining and probability based on
time strategy generates the most revenue ($46,086). However, in all models other than
the hybrid model either the pricing strategy or acceptance probability can be adjusted but
not both. In the sample hybrid model which we have used for the purpose of calculations,
high revenue of $52,755 can be obtained by setting the pricing strategy and acceptance
probability at level 3 as shown in Table 10. This is done using the Process Analyzer part
of the Arena simulation software. Hence the hybrid price and hybrid probability model
out performs all the other models in terms of revenue generated.
Other strategies where the probability of acceptance is based on the price offered
are more or less meant for the price conscious leisure travelers (tourists) who tend to
book their tickets much in advance when the price offered is the lowest where as the
strategies where the probability of acceptance is based on time are applicable to the
business travelers who don’t mind paying a high fare as long as they get to their
destination at the right time. Such customers usually tend to book their tickets late in the
booking period. The hybrid price and hybrid probability strategy covers the scenarios
mentioned above into one model.
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In the next chapter we will develop some new strategies for a network of three
cities with direct and stop-over flights and suggest the optimal strategy to be used.
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CHAPTER 6
NETWORK MODELS

This chapter discusses the main factors used in the development of the network
model of three cities. The main factors to be considered here are the pricing of all the
flight legs, their acceptance probability and also different arrival patterns of customers.

6.1 Flight Network
A network of three cities is considered as shown in Figure 6. There are four
origin-destinations, Tampa-Atlanta (1-2), Atlanta-New York (2-3) and Tampa-New York
(1-3) and Tampa-Atlanta-New York (1-2-3). Their assumed flight capacities and price
ranges are shown in Table 11.
3 New York

Table 11 Flight Capacities and Price Ranges
Atlanta
2

1

Origin- Destination

Flight Capacity

Min Price

Max Price

1-2

200

100

275

2-3

125

100

225

1-3

150

150

350

1-2-3

125

100

300

Tampa

Figure 6 Flight Network

6.2 Pricing Strategy
The pricing strategy for the individual flight legs 1-2 and 2-3 will remain the same
as in the single leg approach as these customers are flying only on these single legs and
do not have a connecting flight. Hence the pricing for these flight legs will be dependent
upon the time remaining, seats remaining and their combination. As observed in Chapter
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5 there could be nine different combination equations for each flight leg and here we
have used only the hybrid combinations as it was found that the combination of time and
seats remaining model gives the maximum revenue. These have been summarized in
Table 10.
However for a customer flying from Tampa to New York can either book on the
direct flight (1-3) or the connecting flight with a stop over in Atlanta (1-2-3). Hence the
problem comes down to pricing the origin-destinations 1-3 and 1-2-3.

6.2.1 Pricing Strategy for Tampa New York (1-3) Direct Flight
The pricing for Tampa New York direct flight (1-3) is assumed to be independent
of the seats remaining on the indirect route (1-2-3). Here we have assumed flight leg 1-3
to be independent and hence the price offered for 1-3 would be similar to the single flight
legs 1-2 and 2-3. It can be either dependent on time remaining, seats remaining or their
combination. Here also we have used the hybrid equations and these have been
summarized in Table 12.

6.2.2 Pricing Strategy for Tampa New York (1-2-3) Indirect Flight
The indirect flight 1-2-3 is offered to generate extra revenue from the vacant seats
on flight legs 1-2 and 2-3. But at the same time it has to be made sure that this flight does
not diminish the revenue generated by the direct flight. Thus, the price offered for the
indirect flight has to be dependent on the seats available for that flight leg, seats
remaining on the direct flight and the price offered for the direct flight. Two strategies
have been used.
Strategy1. In the first strategy the price offered when the booking begins is the cheapest
and there after increases as the seats remaining on the direct flight decrease. The equation
developed for this approach is,
Price Offered123 = Price Offered13 – (Seats Remaining 123 )*j - (150 - Seats
Remaining13 )*k

(7)

Initially, when the booking starts we have
100 = 150 – (125)*j - (150 – 150)*k
Which gives us j = 0.4
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Towards the end of the booking process,
Price Offered123 = 350 – (1)*j - (150 – 1)*k
300 = 350 - 0.4 - 149*k which gives us k = 0.3328
Strategy2. It was observed from the websites of some popular airlines that when the
bookings were opened the indirect flight was priced much higher than the direct flight.
The explanation for this strategy could be that the airline wants to sell the seats on the
direct flight first and then the remaining demand is absorbed of by the indirect flight.
Hence, the price offered for the indirect flight when the booking is opened is the highest
and the ticket price decreases as the booking period advances. The equation developed
for this approach is
Price Offered123 = Price Offered13 – (Seats Remaining 123 )*j - (50 - Seats
Remaining13 )*k

(8)

Initially, the booking starts and all the seats are available, the cheapest price will be
offered for 1-3 and price offered for 1-2-3 will be max. Thus,
300 = 150 – 125*j – (50 - 150)*k which is
100k – 125j = 150
Also towards the end the following condition could prevail,
100 = 350 – 1*j – (50 – 1)*k which is
49k + j = 250
Equating the above two equations we can solve for j and k.
j = 2.8353 and k = 5.0441

6.3 Acceptance Probability Strategy
Acceptance probability equations for the individual flight legs 1-2 and 2-3 will
remain the same as in the single leg approach as these customers are flying only on these
single legs and do not have a connecting flight. These are dependent on the time
remaining to depart, price offered or their combination. Here we have used only their
hybrid combination and it has been stated in Table 13. A customer flying from Tampa to
New York can either book on the direct flight (1-3) or the connecting flight with a stop
over in Atlanta (1-2-3). Hence the question is whether to accept itinerary 1-3 or 1-2-3 or
not to accept the fare at all. The acceptance probability cannot be based on time as both
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Table 12 Normalizing Constants for Pricing Strategy
Flight Leg

Equation

1-2

Price Offered12 = Pmax12 - (Time Remaining) * j
– (Seats Remaining12) * k

2-3

Price Offered23 = Pmax23 - (Time Remaining) * j
– (Seats Remaining23) * k

1-3

Price Offered13 = Pmax13 – (Time Remaining)*j(Seats Remaining 1 3)*k

Criterion
Time and
Seats
Remaining
Time and
Seats
Remaining
Time and
Seats
Remaining

Normalizing Constant
j = 2.9166 & k = 0.4375 (Equal Weights)

j = 2.0833 & k = 0.5 (Equal Weights)

j = 3.3333 & k = 0.6666 (Equal Weights)

Table 13 Normalizing Constants for Acceptance Strategy
Flight Leg
1-2

2-3

Equation
Probability of Acceptance12 = 100 – (Price
Offered12 - Cheapest Price12)*l – (Time
Remaining)*m
Probability of Acceptance23 = 100 – (Price
Offered23 - Cheapest Price)*l – (Time
Remaining)*m

Criterion

Normalizing Constant

Price Offered and Time
Remaining

l = 0.14 & m = 0.83 (Equal Weights)

Price Offered and Time
Remaining
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l = 0.2 & m = 0.83 (Equal Weights)

flights are assumed to depart at the same point in time. Hence the only deciding factors
are the price differential between the direct and stop-over flight and the inability to buy
even the cheapest fare offered for the Tampa New York.

6.3.1 Probability of Not Buying
As mentioned before the customer will decide not to fly Tampa New York (1-3 or
1-2-3) if he is not able to even purchase the lowest offered fare which could be either 1-3
or 1-2-3. Hence two equations are used to determine whether the customer will accept the
fare.
Case 1. Acceptance Probability if the lower price offered is 1-3
Probability of AcceptanceT-NY = 100 – (Price Offered13 –Cheapest Price13)*l (9)
If price offered is maximum, acceptance probability is lower. Hence,
50 = 100 – (350 – 150)*l
Which gives l = 0.25
Case 2. Acceptance Probability if the lower price offered is 1-2-3
Probability of AcceptanceT-NY = 100 – (Price Offered123 –Cheapest Price123)*m
(10)
Similar to Case1, we have
50 = 100-(300 – 100)*m and m = 0.25

6.3.2 Price Differential
If the price difference between the direct and the indirect route is $50 or less than
$50, it is assumed that the customer would rather fly direct route than the stop-over route.
However there would still be some passengers who would want to save that $50 and we
have assumed them to be 10% of this population.
If the price differential is $150 or greater than $150, it is assumed the customers
would rather fly the stop-over route and save some money. However there would still be
some passengers who would want to fly directly and we have assumed them to be 10% of
this population.
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If the price differential is between $50 and $150 then the acceptance probability
equation is
Probability of Acceptance = 10 + (Price Differential – 50)*0.8

(11)

This equation suggests that lower the differential, lower is the probability of flying the
indirect route and higher the differential, higher is the probability of flying the indirect
route.

6.4 Arrival Distribution
The customer arrivals are assumed to follow Poisson distribution with arrival
rates that vary with respect to time and different arrival rates have been used for each
origin-destination. As in the single leg models the booking period of 30 days is divided in
to 6 time slots of 5 days each and each time slot having a different arrival rate.
Three different arrival patterns have been experimented with. The first pattern
shows a mixed type of market with both tourist and business concentration. The second
pattern signifies a business market with customers not really price conscious and booking
towards the end of the booking period. This is shown by an increase in the customer
arrival rate towards the end of the booking process. The third pattern shows a tourist
market where the customer arrivals are concentrated towards the beginning of the
booking process as price conscious tourists generally tend to book at the start. The three
different arrival patterns for on flight leg (1-2) are shown in Figures 7 and the arrival
rates are shown in Table 14.

6.5 Model Development
The booking of all flight legs is assumed to start 30 days in advance and all flights
depart at the same point in time. The fares offered are for the first part of the round trip
and only the forward part of the journey is modeled and return part can be modeled in
similar way. The pricing and acceptance of fares on flight legs 1-2 and 2-3 follows the
same assumptions and parameters used in the single leg approach. The hybrid price and
hybrid probability strategies have been used. Now when a customer for the Tampa-New
York itinerary enters the booking process, two separate fares namely 1-3 and 1-2-3 are
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offered to him. If the customer cannot afford even the minimum of the two offered fares
he leaves the system. If the customer can afford to purchase either of the fares, then the
question is whether he will fly the direct or the indirect route. If the price differential
between the direct and the indirect fares is less than or equal to $50, he is assumed to buy
the direct flight fare (1-3). However there will be some passengers who would still fly the
indirect route (1-2-3) and we have assumed them to be 10% of this population. If the
price differential is $150 or more than $150, the customer is assumed to fly the indirect
route. And there will be some passengers (10%) who would want to avoid the indirect
route and still fly directly. If the price differential is between $50 and $150, the lower the
differential, lower is the probability of flying the indirect route and higher the differential,
higher is the probability of flying the indirect route.

6.5.1 Blocking of Seats in 1-2-3
In this model we have also attempted to exclusively sell the seats on the direct
route (1-3) when the booking process starts, by blocking the seats on the indirect route (12-3) till a certain number of seats on the direct route are sold and then opening up the
seats to be sold on the indirect route. This exclusive reservation of seats on the direct
route is done for 50% (75 seats), 33% (50 seats), 16% (25 seats) and zero seats out of the
total flight capacity of 150 seats. The models developed have been run for a replication
length of 30 days and 200 replications each for the three different arrival patterns and
using both the pricing strategies for Price Offered 123. By setting the number of
replications at 168, the half width for the total revenue generated is less than 1% of its
value. The method for calculating the number of replications is shown in Appendix B.
The results are shown in Table 15, 16 and 17.

6.6 Results and Analysis
In Table 12, the first column indicates the percentage of seats initially reserved for
the direct flight 1-3. This implies that the indirect flight between the destinations (1-2 and
2-3 in our example) will not be opened until certain percentage of direct flight seats is
sold. The model was run with 50% (75 seats), 33% (50 seats) and 16% (25 seats) of the
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Table 14 Arrival Rates and Pattern
Arrival Rate (Number of customers per day for every 5 days)

Itinerary

Total No of

Total Flight

Arrival Pattern 1

Arrival Pattern 2

Arrival Pattern 3

Customers

Capacity

Tampa-Atlanta

4, 6, 8, 10, 6, 8

4, 6, 6, 8, 8, 10

10, 8, 8, 6, 6, 4

213

200

Atlanta-New York

2, 5, 7, 8, 6, 4

2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8

8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 2

155

125

Tampa-New York

5, 7, 8, 11, 9, 8

5, 7, 8, 8, 9, 11

11, 9, 8, 8, 7, 5

232

150

Arrival Pattern 2 (1-2)

Number of
Customers

12
10
8
6
4
2
0
0

10

20

30

12
10
8
6
4
2
0
0

40

10

20

30

40

Days

Days

Arrival Pattern 3 (1-2)

Number of
Customers

Number of customers

Arrival Patern 1 (1-2)

12
10
8
6
4
2
0
0

10

20

30

40

Days

Figure 7 Arrival Pattern
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Table 15 Results for Arrival Pattern 1
% Seats
Reserved
for 1-3
50
(75 seats)

33
(50 seats)

16
(25 seats)

0

Flight
Leg
1-2
2-3
1-3
1-2-3
Total
1-2
2-3
1-3
1-2-3
Total
1-2
2-3
1-3
1-2-3
Total
1-2
2-3
1-3
1-2-3
Total

Revenue
Generated
$23,560
14,013
30,611
4,533
72,719
23,643
13,967
31,835
5,161
74,608
23,576
14,093
33,437
5,784
76,892
24,102
14,076
34,689
6,327
79,196

Strategy 1
Average
Ticket Pr
$179
158
243
230
(829)*
180
159
245
216
(826)*
182
162
247
197
(782)*
185
164
247
181
(739)*

Seats
Vacant
48
16
24
16
45
13
20
13
41
8
15
8
35
4
9
4
-

Customer Flight
Balked
Leg
76
1-2
67
2-3
1-3
95
1-2-3
Total
77
1-2
68
2-3
1-3
88
1-2-3
Total
76
1-2
69
2-3
1-3
78
1-2-3
Total
77
1-2
69
2-3
1-3
64
1-2-3
Total

* half width
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Revenue
Generated
$23,738
13,675
26,989
6,753
71,157
23,886
13,289
27,692
8,805
73,674
23,506
13,077
29,614
9,391
75,589
23,957
12,218
31,336
10,406
77,920

Strategy 2
Average
Seats
Ticket Pr
Vacant
$180
35
157
5
236
36
208
5
(775)*
182
29
158
1
238
13
226
1
(764)*
182
29
158
0
240
27
222
0
(701)*
185
23
158
0
240
20
217
0
(684)*
-

Customers
Balked
77
67
94
77
67
86
76
64
76
78
63
63
-

Table 16 Results for Arrival Pattern 2
% Seats
Reserved Flight
for 1-3
Leg
1-2
50
2-3
(75
1-3
seats)
1-2-3
Total
1-2
33
2-3
(50
1-3
seats)
1-2-3
Total
1-2
16
2-3
(25
1-3
seats)
1-2-3
Total
1-2
2-3
0
1-3
1-2-3
Total

Strategy 1
Revenue
Average
Seats
Generated Ticket Pr
Vacant
$24,071
$182
47
14,757
163
13
30,433
245
25
4,792
229
13
74,054 (858)*
24,356
184
42
14,470
165
11
31,393
247
23
5,436
208
11
75,656 (821)*
24,284
186
38
14,751
168
6
33,006
249
17
5,940
190
6
77,982 (802)*
24,491
189
33
14,424
170
2
34,701
249
11
6,627
177
2
80,244 (738)*
-

Customer
Balked
77
67
95
77
68
88
77
68
78
-78
67
64
-

* half width
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Flight
Leg
1-2
2-3
1-3
1-2-3
Total
1-2
2-3
1-3
1-2-3
Total
1-2
2-3
1-3
1-2-3
Total
1-2
2-3
1-3
1-2-3
Total

Revenue
Generated
$23,977
14,457
27,784
5,813
71,995
24,435
13,673
27,447
8,850
74,406
24,379
13,166
29,160
9,717
76,424
24,511
12,307
30,867
10,790
78,477

Strategy 2
Average
Seats
Ticket Pr
Vacant
$182
38
162
6
239
34
195
6
(785)*
185
28
163
1
239
35
224
1
(702)*
187
25
164
0
241
29
220
0
(684)*
189
20
164
0
241
22
216
0
(666)*
-

Customers
Balked
77
66
95
77
65
86
77
63
77
78
63
58
-

Table 17 Results for Arrival Pattern 3
% Seats
Reserved
for 1-3

50
(75 seats)

33
(50 seats)

16
(25 seats)

0

Strategy 1
Flight
Leg
1-2
2-3
1-3
1-2-3
Total
1-2
2-3
1-3
1-2-3
Total
1-2
2-3
1-3
1-2-3
Total
1-2
2-3
1-3
1-2-3
Total

Revenue
Generated
$21,381
13,041
29,329
4,534
68,286
21,650
13,037
30,578
5,201
70,468
21,827
13,001
32,145
5,960
72,935
21,841
12,998
33,772
6,795
75,407

Average
Ticket Pr
$167
149
233
224
(811)*
169
151
235
209
(771)*
171
152
236
195
(753)*
174
155
236
178
(651)*

Strategy 2
Seats
Vacant
52
17
24
17
47
13
20
13
41
9
14
9
36
3
7
3
-

Customer
Balked
80
70
96
80
71
86
80
71
73
81
70
57
-

* half width

47

Flight
Leg
1-2
2-3
1-3
1-2-3
Total
1-2
2-3
1-3
1-2-3
Total
1-2
2-3
1-3
1-2-3
Total
1-2
2-3
1-3
1-2-3
Total

Revenue
Generated
$21,501
12,678
25,598
6,979
66,758
21,743
12,318
26,423
8,819
69,305
21,977
11,726
28,167
9,682
71,554
22,050
10,810
30,576
10,689
74,127

Average
Ticket Pr
$168
149
225
205
(735)*
170
149
227
217
(675)*
172
148
229
212
(649)*
175
148
231
205
(637)*

Seats
Vacant
38
5
36
5
31
1
34
1
26
0
27
0
22
0
17
0
-

Customers
Balked
80
69
95
80
68
84
80
66
72
81
62
57
-

seats being reserved. The entire table is divided in to two parts, the results for strategy 1
and 2 which is nothing but the two equations we have developed for Price Offered 123 .
From Table 15, we see that the revenue generated progressively increases as the
number of seats reserved for the direct flight goes on decreasing. Reserving seats for the
direct flight does not increase the revenue and the model with no seats reserved gives the
maximum revenue. This is true for both the strategies. When the two strategies are
compared, strategy 1 outperforms strategy 2 in terms of the total revenue generated.
However this difference in the revenue generated is not significant for arrival patterns 1
and 3 (Tables 15 and 17 respectively) as the half widths for the average revenue
generated overlap. But this difference is significant for the arrival pattern 2 as seen from
Table 16.
For strategy 1, the average ticket prices and revenue generated for leg 1-2 and 2-3
remain constant irrespective of the blocking. The revenue generated for direct and
indirect flights increases as the number of seats blocked goes on reducing. This could be
due to the fact that when the most number of seats are blocked (75 seats), the direct flight
seats get sold out faster as the ticket price is lower initially. Also, when the indirect flight
bookings are opened, certain number of seats on the direct flight has been sold and the
direct flight is more costly than the indirect flight. Therefore, there is more demand to
purchase the indirect flight thereby reducing the revenue generated for the direct flight.
But as the blocking of seats goes on reducing and as the bookings for direct and indirect
flight are opened at the same time this direct flight revenue increases.
Average ticket price for the indirect flight when more number of seats are blocked
(75 seats) is higher resulting in less customers buying and hence, lower revenues. But
when no seats are blocked the average ticket price is much lower resulting in more
demand and hence more revenue generated. This combined increase in the revenue of
direct and indirect flight results in a higher total revenue generated when no seats are
blocked. Similar conclusions can be dram from strategy 2. The best pricing strategy to be
used for different type of markets can be summarized according to Table 18.
In this chapter we have seen a flight network of three cities. Pricing strategies and
customer acceptance strategies for the four origin destinations have been discussed.
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Further, the sale of the indirect flight seats was blocked until a percentage of the direct
flight seats were sold. These strategies were tested for the three different patterns of
arrival. The results suggested the optimal strategy to be followed. In the final conclusion
chapter of this thesis, we will summarize the entire thesis and discuss the future
extensions that can be carried out.

Table 18 Best Pricing Strategy for Network Model

Strategy to be
followed

Arrival Pattern
Mixed

Business

Tourist

Strategy 1 or 2

Strategy 1

Strategy 1 or 2
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter we will briefly summarize the research undertaken in this thesis
and also state the scope for future research.

7.1 Summary and Conclusions
In this research, a very important problem faced by the airline industry namely
ticket pricing was considered. Different strategies such as pricing strategy, customer
acceptance probability strategy and factors such as customer arrival rates and arrival
distribution were considered. Initially the pricing policy for a single flight leg was
developed. Three different pricing strategies namely time remaining, seats remaining and
their combination were developed. Also, customer behavior such as probability of
acceptance based on price offered and the time remaining to depart was studied. The
pricing strategies were tested using simulation models for three different customer arrival
rates. Following conclusions were drawn.
•

For a tourist destination where the probability of acceptance was based on price,
the pricing according to seats remaining was the optimal policy. This policy gave
a lower average ticket price and higher revenues thus benefiting both the customer
and the airline.

•

For a business destination where the acceptance probability was based on time,
pricing according to time remaining generated the most revenue.

•

For a mixed type of destination where the acceptance probability was based on
both time to depart and the price offered, the pricing according to both seats
remaining and time remaining outperformed all the other strategies.
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We also investigated the impact of offering indirect (stop-over) flights on the
revenue generated by considering a network of three cities where travel can be made both
direct and with a stop-over. Two different strategies were developed. According to the
first strategy the pricing for both the direct and indirect flights was cheapest at the start of
the booking period and ended with the last ticket being sold at the maximum price. The
second strategy suggested a reverse path with the indirect flight being sold at the
maximum price at the start of the booking period and the price reducing there after. This
was done to discourage the selection of indirect flights early in the booking process. The
first strategy always outperformed the second strategy in terms of revenue generated with
their difference being significant for an arrival pattern resembling a business destination
and insignificant for arrival patterns for the tourist and mixed destinations.
Also the effect of blocking of indirect route until a certain proportion of seats on
the direct route were sold was investigated. It was observed that this approach did not
increase the revenue. The model with no seats blocked generated the most revenue.
The single leg models for the low and medium rate of arrival were tested using
another example with a different price range, flight capacity and corresponding arrival
rates. The results were found to be consistent indicating the robustness of the models we
have developed. Thus, an attempt was made in this research to develop a set of ticket
pricing policies that could benefit the airline industry.

7.2 Scope for Further Research
Some of the extensions that can be undertaken to make this research more widely useful
are:
1. It is known that every airline overbooks its flights to compensate for
cancellations, no-shows etc. This extra revenue obtained from overbooking could
contribute to the overall revenue generated. Hence, the factors such as
cancellations, no-shows and overbooking could be integrated with the policies
that have been developed in this research. The impact of these factors on the
relative performance of different strategies can be investigated.
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2. These days airlines offer fare prices to customers by taking into account the fares
offered by the ir competitors. This competition aspect in the airline industry with
regards to ticket pricing could be considered. Game theory based models could
probably be used to investigate this aspect of the problem. The other related
aspect that could be studied is the impact of alliance or code sharing. Code
sharing provides a way for both major carriers and established regional carriers to
expand their customer base by feeding in to each other’s flight networks.
3. The ticket pricing strategies that we have developed are with the expectation of
one customer buying one ticket. Discount could be given to large groups buying
together and hence, this aspect of group bookings may impact the revenue
generated specially in low demand markets.
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Appendix A Analysis of Variance
A1 The Analysis of Variance for the Medium Rate of Arrival.
Multilevel Factorial Design
Factors:
Base runs:
Base blocks:

2
9
1

Replicates:
Total runs:
Total blocks:

10
90
1

Number of levels: 3, 3

General Linear Model: Revenue Generate versus Price Offered, Probability
Factor
Pricing Strategy
Acceptance Probability

Type
fixed
fixed

Levels
3
3

Values
1, 2, 3
1, 2, 3

Analysis of Variance for Revenue Generated, using Adjusted SS for Tests
Source
Pricing Strategy
Acceptance Prob
Pricing Strat*Accept
Probability
Error
Total

S = 3573.45

DF
Seq SS
2
116590110
2 1685751160
4
13230612
81
89

Adj SS
116590110
1685751160
13230612

1034331612
2849903494

R-Sq = 63.71%

Adj MS
58295055
842875580
3307653

1034331612

F
4.57
66.01
0.26

P
0.013
0.000
0.903

12769526

R-Sq (adj) = 60.12%

From the above analysis we see that the F values for pricing strategy (4.57) and
acceptance probability (66.01) are greater than F0.05, 2, 81 (3.15). Hence we can conclude
that both Pricing Strategy and Acceptance Probability are significant factors and their
interaction Pricing Strategy*Acceptance Probability is not significant as its F value (0.26)
is less than 3.15.

A2 The analysis of Variance for the High Rate of Arrival.
Multilevel Factorial Design
Factors:
Base runs:
Base blocks:

2
9
1

Replicates:
Total runs:
Total blocks:

10
90
1

Number of levels: 3, 3
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Appendix A (continued)
General Linear Model: Revenue Generate versus Price Offered, Probability
Factor
Price Offered
Probability

Type
fixed
fixed

Levels
3
3

Values
1, 2, 3
1, 2, 3

Analysis of Variance for Revenue Generated, using Adjusted SS for Tests
Source
DF
Seq SS
Adj SS
Adj MS
F
Pricing Strategy
2
135062050
135062050 33765512 4.30
Acceptance Prob
2 1502155964 1502155964 751077982 64.49
Pricing Strat*Accept 4
1220663
1220663
305166
0.03
Probability
Error
81
943289950 943289950 11645555
Total
89 2454497317

S = 3412.56

R-Sq = 61.57%

P
0.002
0.000
0.999

R-Sq (adj) = 57.77%

From the above analysis we see that the F values for pricing strategy (4.30) and
acceptance probability (64.49) are greater than F0.05, 2, 81 (3.15). Hence we can conc lude
that both Pricing Strategy and Acceptance Probability are significant factors and their
interaction Pricing Strategy*Acceptance Probability is not significant as its F value (0.03)
is less than 3.15.
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Appendix B Method for Calculating the Number of Replications
The equation used for calculating the number of replications to obtain a specific value of
half width is
n = n0 * h0 2 / h2 [Kelton, Sadowski and Sadowski, 2002]
where,
n = number of replications
n0 = number of initial replication
h0 = half width from the initial replications
h = half width required

If the total revenue generated from 10 replication is 39,941 and the half width is 2,329, to
obtain a half width of 2% of 39,941 which is 798, we have
n = 10* (2,329 / 798)2
n = 85.17 which we can round off to 100 replications.
Similarly, if the total revenue generated from 10 replication is 79,885 and the half width
is 3,279, to obtain a half width of 1% of 79,885 which is 798 we have
n = 10 * (3,279 / 798)2
n = 168
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